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Freedom Of Conscience:
Separating Church And State
By Jethro K. Lieberman

ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
Religious oppression is older tha.n the pyramids
of Egypt and as current as dour autocrats in
Moscow, Peking, Teheran, Baghdad, and divers
other capitals of the world today. One of the dominant themes of human history, religious intolerance
unhappily continues, its ferocious thirst unslaked
by centuries of killing, torture, and repression. You
might suppose after all this time, after the Pharoanic
cruelties, the lion pits of Rome, the Crusades, the
lnqulsil'ion, and the carnage of the twentieth century, that those who kill or main in God's name
might have bl'Come a trifle embarrassed, but that's
not how they think.
You might csr>cclally suppose that those to whom
it has been done would be sober enough not to do
it unto others, but that's not how even most victims think - not our very own Puritans, for instance. Forced to aupport the Church of England,
the Pll~:~rlm' fled, first to Holland and then to
Americo. But travel did not make them more
tolerant. They wiahcd religious freedom for
themselves, not for others.
Until 1692, the established church of
M11os;schusclts was Congrcg;~ tional : residents of
each town were asseatJCd fo1 the payment of a
minister. After 1692, the law dropPf:d the requirement that the church be Congreg11tlonal, though it
r~mained 110 in mott toWn!• until 1727 simply
because a majority of taxpay1~ r• were CongrcBa·
Ilona!. In 1727, the law W/11 chilngctl to perm it
l!p l ~copallan s to pily taxes ta their church; they
were no longer rcqulr.:d to c:onrrlbult: to the Congrcfllltfonal church. In 1729, Q u11 kus .~~nd Uoptl!l&
wurc cJCcmpled fr om pllyill8 I xc:s lvr mlnl~tcr8'
M lnrl " ~' cV"'I1 of their own chw•ch ..-~. ;tit hough lh •
V,l, 5tJ-·No. J9·-101311/J7

law was not always fairly applied. For more than
a century, until 1833, Massachusetts had two
established churches.
Other colonies had officially established churches. New York, Connecticut, and New Hampshire
had multiple establishments. In New York, towns
that were religiously heterogeneous taxed each congregation to build and support its own c;hurches.
In five sou them stales - Georgia, Marylund, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia - the
Episcopalian church (the transplanted Church of
England) was the sole established state church.
Every person was bound to go lo that church on
Sundays and to pay ta.xes lo main tall • the church,
regard less of belief. Only De.laware, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode lslQnd were fre11 of officially established churches.
Laws establishing churches, it should be
understood, were not intended simply to raise
revenue. They were, at least initiaUy, punitive
regulatlon9 designed to force conduct conforming
to the majority's religious :encls. A 1614 Virginia
law mandated whipping for those who rcfuiiCd to
be te.>sted by a mlni ~ h.'l' for ''exnmlnation in the
fnlth ." The tl1 ird timC! a parishioner broke the Sabbath, he or she could be execull'<l. The death penulty waGalao ava ilable for speaking "lmf!lously of thi:
Trinity or one of thl? Divine PcniOns, or against the
known articles of Christian faith."
l·.orroR'~ Nou: This arUcl~ Is Chaph!r 12 (foolnotn
or'>llled) of "Thr Enduring Conalllullon" authom! by
)#thrn K. IJcbcrman rl<.l published In 19117 by Wn t
l'ublt•hlns Co. nnd Harptr &: Row PuiJIIshen. It I•

mprlntrd h1!Te with pcnnl» lun of IM 1uthor And the
publisher . © CopyriMhl Je t~ru K. Llmerrn• n. 1987
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I.J11ting ttw next c<:ntu>·y, the rnediev;:il belief that
peoplt: mw;t :~vow publicly, l,y word ;md cond'' ';t.
their :uJherence to a particular creed g1·adu;.Jly
wan<:d. By the time of· the Revolution, some states
stood firmly against dwn:h establdunt:nt, altiHlugh
the pr;u:tiu: was not wholly abolished. Tht:
constitutions of New fersey and Pl'll.nsylvania were
ellplicit that uo person could be obligated t(J pay
for any church bu ilding or mi11lster's salary. The
North Carolina constitution of 1/'76 <1nd New
Yol'ic's constitution of 17/'7 eliminated establislnnent
outrit,ht.
Other states <:ei:lsed their preference for one
p~rticul;)r religion. In its 1'l!JO Cot1stitution ,
Ma~ sac:hu setts l:lllpowerNl the lt:gislature ·t<> rnakt:

public wor:;h ip compubory at1d lo (:ollect talles to
support Iilini:;ters, but th:: money was to go to tho::e
of the t~><payers' own d::~)oulination, if a minister
of that pers1.~1 s ion preached in their town or ne;nby.
The legislature was bMrcd f.-orn subordinating "any
one sec! or denomination to the othel'."
Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, New Hampshire,
and South Carolina followed this pat·te.m to varying
degrees (ln 1778, South Carolina proclaimed the
"Christian Protestant religion"t·o be the state
religion, a provision that was dropped in 1790 wlu' n
religion was disestablished).

!Jut it was Vil'ginia's abolition of· the established
Church of En~;;land in 1'lll5 that was to lt;tve the
rnnst pregnant con~;equcnces fol" An1eric t 11~
constittJtionalisuJ. The fight was lt:d by Jcffer:;orl,
wh!J!i(: Statute of Hcligious Lioerty, drafted in 177/,
wa~ adopted eight years later, and by M:>dlson,
whose "Memorial and Remon st rance Against
Religious A ssessments" had "sta~gerlng" political
effc:ct in electing a dlsestablishmentarian legislature
that enacted Jefferson 1s bill. Jefferson regarded the
statuti' ;md IJ.:clar;Jtion of lnd<~pt!!H.l~nn• <1 ~; the two
most in1pMtant p roduct:; of hi:; ever fertile mind.

Jcffer::on alway:; held religion to be a priv;ott:
matter. Granting th <,ll the governm:?nt could
prohibit injurlou~ act!>, l1e deda n:d :"But it does me
no injury for my IH~ itr,hbor to say ti'I<J t tiH:t'e .,.-.,
twenty godu , or Ill) god . It ndtlwr pic:ks my poclw t
nor lne;d(li my If:!,.'' A li houg h by 1776, Virgini ;~ h ~ d
cont;idr:n.ilily n1 odN.1 tt:d it;.; l;~wn ;~;.,<'l.il'J fl t di1W•nte n:,
it rmTii.1it1cd i:! j ;:rii ;Jb l•~ offrm :o:·: lo deny the lrir1ity IJr
the divir1ity nf the Bible. Jdf6:rwn wi•rhl'd to ft·t~ ·
th1: lll.ln'lim 111ind from <:w·ry I>I·J;,rclde, to vwtoep i'JW~y
tl'l<'! ifJtclkctw~ l fmggag•: uf prcvinu • ccntude~ th a t
irnpriww~d fn:e lnquli'y Mtd the exprea8liln ,,,f
opirdnn.

The Vi''!;inia ~itat1.1l1: of f{t'iit;iou:; Fn:1:dom
pr<.)Vi (kd th<>t
no rnan :;hall ),.: compelled to r,·,;quent or
s upport any n•li1; ious won;hip , plan:, or
mini:;t,·y what:;ocver, no•· sha ll In: enforced,
re:;trained, lftole:•; ted, or burdened in l1is body
or goods, or shall otlwrw·ise suffer, on account
of his religious opinion s 01· lwlid; but that all
men shall he free to pmf.:!;s, and by argument
to maintain, thei•· opilliOllS in matiers of
r •ligion, ;mel that th.: same •;!J ;Jll in no wise
diminish, mi;Jrge, or affect their civil Glpacities.
This provision appli1:d to ;dl; not nu:n,:ly
dis';cllkrs from the established bo.1t also nonC hristians and even athci:;ts wt:re r;uarantc.:d
a bs olute ft•eedom of couscience. MOldison saw the
s tatute ;~s forever extinguishing "the ambitious hope
of making laws for the human mind." So strong
were the sentiments of Jefferson and Madi!;on that
both, a s presid<mt, woJ;Id IJtcr refw;c ewn to
proclaim natior~<li holidays of thanksg iving because
they believed th;,t doing so unconstitution;<lly
e11tangled slate and clwrch.
·r·hc frame•~•. in Al'ticle VI. had laid down the
principle that no religiou s te:;t could ever b:~
required as a qualification for federal public office.
Taking up the broader cause in the First Congress,
Madison penned the language of an amendment
denying Congress power to legislate in religious
matters. The constitutional phrases themselves were
gradually extended duri11); tlw C0\11' "-i: of debate, to
1m:;un~ that Congress h;1ve t'w pow<:t to li:g isl;·,tc in
religious matters, ratlH!r than, as cert;1in Sena te
vcr:;ions in'iplir,.J, a power to <<id ndigion gcner1Jlly
a:; long it it did not prefer on<: rdi1;io n ovt' r tJI'lother.
The How;c version was ratified in tlw Fi n; t
Arm:ndrnent: "Congrcs!; :;klll m ~ k1• no J;,,w
n :specting an establi gJunent of re li g ion, or
prohibiting tlu: fn:c cxcrci!;c thereof."

TB£ "WAU. OF SH'AnATION"
In 11\02, Prr:"idr:ni Jdiet~;nn wrol•• thot Oa nl.Hitj'
(Connrcticut) IJ~tptbt A~' ~"C i ; Jtion th" t tlw t" il'l!t
hm J:ndnw nt ln tilt " 1il will! of ~ cpar;)[inn br.twe'l:n
clwr~: h ;u'td ~;t;,.tc." Hi:•; farno u ~, !datt~ m~.·nt n!' 1r';~ in.(t
the lenlr;·; l rn1:lc>phor for iutl'l'p l'l! tit1 g th~.: fr~d(JI7J
of rdiuiooE; d;w~l; :;. l>1.1t llkllilll ITII~t a pllol', it :1 u~~t:1
mo cc quc •: tion• than it anJ wt•rr. .
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government, the better that the peopl~ could
achieve their secular purposes through the state and
their religious purposes through independent
churches. (The founders, of course, meant to deny
all power over religion to Congress; today, by
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment., that power
is denied the states as well.)
The First Amendment seeks to ensure these
pos5ibilities by simultaneously barring "an
t.ostablishment of religion" and prohibiting state
interference with the ''exercise" of religion. These
clauses can work in tandem: Imposing a tax on the
citizenry to build and majntain a particular church
both establishes that church and interferes with
dissidents' freedom to worship as they will. But
frequent ly there is tension between the
establishment and free exercise clauses. For
example, a provi1Jion in the Tennessee constitution
prohibited priests "of any denomination'' from
silting In thf! sta'te legl9lature - a position Jeffl'!rson
advocated. Yet by seeking to prevent any
enta(lglement betw«n !!tate and church, Tenneasee
impoS£d a severe burden on a person's profession
of rellgiouiJ belief. In 1978, the Supreme Court
unanimously 'o'Oided the ban. Liknvlse, to prevent
entanglement, a dty might argue that It could not
provide pollee or fire prot« lien to churchrs within
Jts bc1undarfa, but so rigid a policy would
dJgcrfmlnafe against churchn and Interfere with the
right of thelr congregl!lnl!IIO exerd~ the:lr rrliglon.

Beyond the potmti..1J conflkt betvlft.ol the clau!ln
llet the quntlon of degrw. How much slate action
toward rrllg.lon con•tllutes an ntabllthmrnt or an
lnfrlngemmt11t1 other WOTdJ, how hlsh (or ~trai!VJO
un the wall be - or mult II bt1
Vol. S~--No. J9-101Jll17

ESTABLISHMENTS OF REUGION:
THE MODERN VIEW

In 1947, a case involving public funds for bus
transportation to and from all elementary school~,
both public and parocrual, Justice Black wrote:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the
First Amendment means at least this: Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can set up
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid a U religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influenll!
a person to go to or to remain away from
church against his will or force him to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, la.rge or small, can be levied to support
any religious activitie"$ or Institution, whatever
they may in called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religjon. Neither a
ntate nor the Federal Government can, OPfnly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious ·organiza ti ons or group! and vi~
vcr111o1. In lhe words of JeHcnon, the clause
tlgain~l ettablishment of n:Ugion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of !ieparu.Hon bttwecn
church and State."
A powP.rtul religious current in recent years ha•
IlK! some to s u~ptlH that Black was wron In
d11clarlng thilt · th e Flnt Amendment bars
government from o~idlns rell I n (in the p rtic:ular
ca~. public funding for parochial echool buMS w11
uph Jd). According to proponent& f thl~ vWw, th
PlrJt Am ndm!!nt "was lntmdnl only to pt'I'Vt'nl the

ms

state from preferring one religion over another, not
to stop the stale from aiding religion in general. As
William F. Buckley has put it, the First Amendment
"was not designed to secularize American life, [but
was intended) merely to guard against an
institutionalized preeminence of a single religion
over others on a national scale."

contravene the Establishment Clause if it has a
secular legislative purpose, if its principal or
primary effect neither advances nor inhibits
religion, and if it does not foster an excessive
government entanglement with religion." If a state
practice fails any part of this test, it is
unconstitutional.

Buckley is twice wrong. This narrow
interpretation of the establishment clause is not
plausible. Nor does the broader interpretation of
the First Amendment thereby "secularize American
life."

The test is easy to state, but here especially, as
Justice Holmes taught, "general propositions do not
decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on
a judgment or intuition more subtle than any
articulate major premise." What follows is a
summary of the intuition that has guided the Court
during the past four decades, the period of active
religion jurisprudence.

Establishment did not mean to the framers an
official status for a single, particular church; it
meant an official position for any churches that
dtizens could be compelled to support through taxes
and attendance. In barring an establishment, the
framers intended not merely to prevent a particular
church from receiving state endorsement over
others but also to prevent any endorsement at all.
Recall that those who opposed a bill of rights did
so not because they wished their rights to be taken
away but because they held that Congress had been
given no power to do so. This was particularly true
about power to enact legislation concerning
religion. A bill of right11 was therefore unnecessary;
worse, some feared, it might even be dangerous
because it would imply that whatever was not
explicitly forbidden might somehow be implied as
a power of the federal government (hence the Ninth
Amendment). The modern suggestions that
Congress may aid religion show that tho!M: dangers
were rightly apprehended.

The impotence of Congress to fotter religion does
not, however, "secularize American life." To the
contrary, the First Amendment leaves Americans
free, on their own, to live as rellglous a life u they
detire, short only of government lnvolvmmt.

Bee. use the govm1mmt may not prevent Buckley's
neJghbor from profaning the Lord does not mean
that Buckley mt.ttt go about bla9phemlng. Becau.e

the government rm~y not force me to .a tend church
doa not mean that you cannot go as often u you
Ilk.. Becau.e the govrmrmnt may not lead my
chiJdrftl In pr1yn In publk Khool doet not mean
that my chlldrftl may not pr1y therr on their own.
To ckt«rmlne the conetltutionl!llity of legislation
or other governme11 action l htt • ff~l f religion, l~
Supreme Court hu followed • porou,, thrH·
prons-d 10 11 "• legltl.ttlw en 11cfm en l doet nol

Financial Support for Religious Activities
A string of federal and state enactments have
tested the limits of government financial aid to
religious institutions, in particular to sectarian
schools. The three-pronged test, largely developed
through these cases, has proven notoriously difficult
to apply, and through the 19705 and 1980s, shifting
majorities of justices have led to results that have
seemed contradictory, if not paradoxical. As
Leonard F. Manning has summed them up:
Lawyer and layman alike must have been
wondrously perplexed when the Court told u&
that the state would be compelled to police the
teaching of the partially subsidized secular
instructor in the churc~affiliated elmumtary
and secondary schools, although surveillance
i11 not mandated to guard against indoctrination
in the wholly funded public !1Chool; that the
state may lend text books to parochial school
students but that it may not lend those same
students, or their parents, movie projectors,
tape records, record playen, maps and globes,
sclmce kits .>r weather forecasting charts; that
a atate may exm1pt church property from
taxation but that It may not provide sta~
Income tax aedJtr~ or Income tax deductions for
parents who pay tuJtlon to church-related
elementary and NCondary tchools; that IM
ttate may provide fr« bue trantportation, •o
and from school, for chlldtftl allendln&
p rothlal schoole but lt may not p rovkl the
tam l! lraniiJ>Ortatlon for tM u rn ttucknts for
trlpt to aovemmmtal, Industrial, cultural and
Kimllfk ""em
fNl«J to mrich theft MCUiar
tfudift; that IM tt a~ may provkk dim:1 ,
Vol. •~-No. J9-l01)1 16'J

noncategorical funding of church-related
colleges, but may not provide indirect, and
restricted financial assistance for churchaffiliated secondary schools; that the state may
not provide for children with special needs,
remedial and accelerated instruction, guidance
counseling and testing, speech and hearing
services, on nonpublic school premises, but that
it may provide speech and hearing diagnostic
services in the nonpublic school; and that the
state may provide - in public schools, public
centers or mobile units - therapeutic services
for deaf, blind, emotionally disturbed, crippled
and physically handicapped nonpublic school
children but that it may not provide the same
services for the same children on the nonpublic
school premises.
Contradictory though the results may seem, they
are perhaps best explained as the Court's groping
attempt to construct a zigzagging wall of separation
to accommodate some secular interests that
somehow "feel" as though they would neither
advance nor hinder anyone's religious practice. To
use another set of examples, the Court has rejected
a "released-time" program in which public schools
ended an hour early one day a week to permit
students to attend voluntary religious instruction
in the schoolrooms, whereas it has permitted a
similar program in which students who volunteered
could leave the tchool grounds to go to religious
centers for religious instruction. In the latter case,
the students were pursuing their religion elsewhert!;
in the former, the school was inextricably entangled
in the religioUJI activity. The distinction suggests the
aubtle feel by which the Court has been constructing
the wall.

and Bible reading in public schools. The first prayer
case, in 1962, involved a "nondenominational"
prayer written by the New York Board of Regents.
Said Justice Black: "[It) is no part of the business
of government to compose official prayers for any
group of the American people to recite as a part of
a religious program carried on by the government."
In 1963, the Court rejected a Pennsylvania law that
required teachers to read aloud passages from the
Bible and students to recite in unison the Lord's
Prayer. Despite the outcry, the practice surely
flunked all three prongs of the establishment test:
There was no secular legislative purpose, the
primary effect of the reading was to advance
religion, and public readings fostered excessive
government entanglement in religious activity. That
the practice of govemment~ponsored prayer is an
impermissible establishment seems especially clear
in view of prayer advocates' failure to be satisfied
by the obvious alternative. Nothing that the Court
has ever said prohibits individual schoolchildren on
their own to pray in the schoolyard before classes,
in the opening minutes while the teacher is calling
the class to order, or at any quiet moment during
the day. The only purpose in school prayer is to
place the government's imprimatur on the practice,
and that is precisely what the establishment clause
forbids.
To be sure, children who do not wish to
participate in the prayer or Bible reading could sit
sUently or be excused. Erwin S. Griswold, then dean
of Harvard Law School, argued that the state does
not do ill in thus setting these children apart:

Government spenda money on religlous activities
In way11 other than fiChools. For example, It pays
for chaplains ln the armed forces and prlsono.
Though given the opportunity, the Court has NVer
disapproved theae activities because although the
~penditures obvlou11ly tend toward a rcllglout
establishMent, the failure to do 10 would amount
to government lnteriemu:e with aoldlers' and
Inmates' free excrd~e of rtllglon. In a conte.t
bdwHn the two rcllslon clau~e~, the free cxcrdse
clause will 1.11ually be paramount.

Is it not desirable, and educational, for (the
child of a nonconfonning or minority group)
to learn and observe this [difference in beliefs),
In the atmosphere of the school - not so much
as he is dlfferent as that other children art
different from hlrn7 And Is It not desirable that,
at the same Hme, he experienca and le.tms the
fact that hia dtHervnct! is tolerated and
acc~ted7 No compulsion Is put upon him. He
need not participate. Dut he, too, haa the
opportunity to be tolerant. He allows the
majority of the 1roup to follow thtir own
tradition, perhaps comlna to undrnt.tnd and
rnpect what they fftl Is al&niflc.tnt to thm\.

In ca~e~ that han lniurlateci more than archfundamcnt.IIJU, the Court hat ttruck down prayrrt~

Titla Ia an odd way to put the malltr: Ought we
not prefer that the majority lum to toler.tte the
p,..ctlcn of the minority? Minorities have many
(and • llfdl,.'a) waya to ~am wN!t wts thm\

Vol. 56-No. 39-10131167

apart. Something is inherently unequal in the
equality of tolerance that Griswold so facilely
proposes - rather like the nineteenth-century
Supreme Court justices who said that laws requiring
racial segregation did not stamp blacks as inferior;
it was all in their minds.
Bans on Secular Dodrines: "Monkey laws"
Evolutionists have ~n fighting fundamentalists
(who today call themselves "creationists") ever since
Darwin. Gaining national notoriety in the Scopes
trial in 1925 in Tennessee, the issue is whether a
stale may bar teachers from talking about the
theory that Homo sapiens has evolved from lower
animal orders. In 1968, a case testing an Arkansas
"monkey law" reached the Supreme Court, which
unanimously struck it down on the finding that the
state had selected "from the body of knowledge a
particular segment which it proscribes for the sole
reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular
religious doctrine."
Government-Sponsored Religious Symbols:
The "Creche" Case

It ought to follow that when the government
affinnatively sponsors religious symbols, it is
similarly violating the establishment clause. But
symbols have proved more resilient, perhaps
because they have become so cheapened that we
scarcely notice tht-m . Our currency redtes that "In
God We Trust" (as do any number of public
buildings). Is that motto an establishment of
religion? The issue has never been tested.
But in 1984, the Supreme Court narrowly
approved the public funding in Pawtucket, Rhode
Island, of a creche, a nativity scene displayed in a
park In the heart of the downtown shopping center.
The Court's ut01ted rationale wu that Chri11tmas is
a r,atlonal holiday and the creche fulfllled an
nsentlally tecular purpo.e; In any event, It was a
"paHlvc nymbol" of a "cdebratlon acknowledged
In the Wcsltm World for 20 centuries."
Concurring, Ju stice OConnor sought to square
the result wllh the three-pronged teat. l!ven II tht:
!reche hnd a lf!CU I r purpoM, she noted, It would
~till fall the tnt II govemmmt Intended nnerthelets
"to convey a rneguge of endanc:men t or
dl pproval of religion." Thr creche patted the te~~t,
thr u ld, bec•uee P1wtucket had not Intended to
mdorH Christianity: The cr.che h1d become one
l/19!}

of the symbols of a "holiday [that) itself has very
strong secular components and traditions."
Dissenting, Justice Bnnnan condemned a
"beguilingly simple, yet faulty syllogism": that to
recognize Christmas as a public holiday perm.its tt- ~
conclusion that the creche is constitutionally
pennissible because the creche is "nothing more
than a traditional element of Christmas
celebrations." BreMan would separate the secular
from the sectarian elements and symbols of the
holiday: Santa Claus is secular, Jesus is not.
Interpreting Religious Doctrine
The courts may construe symbols to determine
secular meaning, but they may not sit to interpret
religious doctrine to determine which faction in a
fight over church property or church office is
entitled to its use. A state court may not decide that
a national religious organization has so departed
from the ecclesiastical doctrines of the church that
a local congregation is entitled to sever the parent
body's control over the local church property.
Ecclesiastical questions are for church authorities,
n.ot civil courts. Nor may a court set aside a church's
defrocking of its bishop despite a claim that the
church had violated its own rules: "A civil court
must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church
tn'bunals as it finds them." (These cases demonstrate
that the Fir5t Amendment prohibits any branch of
the government, not ju5t legislatures, from actions
that tend toward an establishment of religion.)

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION:
THE MODERN VIEW
The government may undert11ke neither to
establish nor to prohibit individuals from freely
exercising their religion . But the free exercise clause
has its own difflcultits: May the re.~giou~ ecc ntrlc
justify any action by pointing to Its rell&ious
slgnlflcance7 In a nation devoted to huckaterlam,
that seems a tall propoaition. Hue, as In the caw
of the free speech cia usc:, the courts have tended to
dl&llnguish between ~lief and conduct, though the
words again mask how diHicult It Is to distinguish
at the m rgln.
Rlsht to ProNiytlze
Communlc nta' active protelytidna on beh.-lf of

their faith IB larsely protected aplru: clalma thai
In to doing they may offmd of MD and thu. dtl4urb

Th" Olclahoftllf nar /aumul
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itself in a case coming from West Virginia. In an
often-quoted passage, Justice Jackson declared: "If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."

the peace. In an early case, a Jehovah's Witness
played a phonograph on a public street; the record
attacked all organized religious systems as
instruments of £alan, in particular the Roman
Catholic church. His intention was to persuade
passersby to contribute money "in the interest of
what (he), however misguided others may think of
him, conceived to be true religion." Passersby were
in fact offended; the neighborhood in which he had
set up his booth was 90 percent Catholic. He was
conv1cted of violating both a breach-of-peace law
and a licensing law requiring him to obtain the
permission of the secretary of the public welfare
council, who was tmpowered to determine whether
solicitations were for religious or charitable causes.
The Supreme Court reversed. A narrowly drawn
statute that prohibited all noise from the public
streets might have withstood challenge, but not a
prosecution obviously aimed at clamping down on
"obnoxious" religious discussion. The licensing
scheme was struck down on the same grounds that
the Court had voided similar ordinances involving
nonreligious speech.

Well into the nineteenth century, many states
required just that: Public officeholders were
required to swear a belief in Christianity or even
Protestianism. Though this restriction disappeared
by 1877 (New Hampshire was the last holdout), a
similar oath of belief in God remained in the
constitutions of eight states. The Supreme Court
finally struck these down in 1961, in a case in which
Maryland refused to commission a notary public
because he refused to declare that he believed in
God . And in 1977, the Court voided a New
Hampshire la w that car owners display the sta te
motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plates,
again in a case brought by Jehovah's Witnesses.

Enforced Speech Repugnant to One's Creed

Forced Choices

The free exercise clause will not permit the state
to dictate what a person must say or affirm. In the
"flag salute cases," the Supreme Court in 1940
upheld a Minersville, Pennsylvania, public school
rule requiring all students to salute the flag and
recite the usual pledge of allegiance on pain of
expulsion. The pledge offended the Jehovah's
Witnesses' literal interpretation of the Bible. The
Court's ruling upholding the flag salute ("the
symbol of natk>nal unity") set in motion in milny
communities across the country a series of violent
reactions to the Witnesses' very presence. (Pious
and unyielding, con!!idered beyond the pale of mere
eccentricity by many mainstream Protc9tants, "a
sect," in Zechariah Chafee's phrase, "distinguished
by great religious zeal and astonishing powcrM of
annoyance, " Jehovah's WltnCJ~ses have figured In a
tubttantial number of th~ significant free exercise
casn, to the greater benefit of all religions In
A~rka. ) Scoret of tchool boards runht.'d to adopt
fl ag n lute ru les, but u Judge J. Skelly Wright
concluded, "the words of the Supreme Court, that
the protection of lreedom could best be left to the
r~apon albillty of local •uthorltlet, were perverted
•nd u&ed • an excute for wha t was In e ffect
religious penec:ullon by the local tchool board9."
Three yun later, the Suprl!me Court reverted
Vol. 5/J-No. J9-101.HI87

A Seventh-Day Adventist in South Carolina was
discharged from her job because she refused to work
on Saturday, her Sabbath. She applied for but was
denied state unemployment compensation becau5e
she refused,"without good cause," to undertake
suitable work offered her (namely, her job).
Although the compensation law was "religion
blind," it worked an obvious discrimination against
the applicant, and in 1963 the Supreme Court struck
down the state's work test. Her ineligibility
stemmed entirely from her religion. The rule
impoaed on her "forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning ont of
the precepts of her religion to accept work, on the
other. Governmental imposition of 1uch a choice
puts the tame kind of bW'dcn upon the frft exercise
of religion 111 would a fire imposed aplnat appellant
for her Saturday worship."
Thl~ cate suggests the pottlbility that the Court's
earlier decillions in the Sunday Closing law Ca~n
might In time be reverMd. In oM oi thOM caMS,
an Orthodox Jew had protnted a law that
compelled him to ciOM his atore on Sund•y. even
thou6h his religion compelled him to dow on
Sllturday, d 011ln8• that lopthn lmprrlled his
ec:onomlc !IUrv lval . TM Court uphtklthe Sunday
ordinance.

Exemption from a Secular Duty:
Conscientious Objection

Unlawful Religious Conduct

The tangled history of the conscientious objector
provisions in the federal draft laws is beyond our
scope. The Supreme Court has never ruled
definitively that Congress must exempt from the
military draft those who object to "war in any form"
on religious grounds. But Congress has long
provided such an exemption. An important
subsidiary question, however, is what exactly
constitutes a religion for purposes of the exemption.
Until 1967, the federal law defined religion as a
"belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving
duties superior to those arising from any human
relation but [not including! essentially politicaL
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code." In a 1965 case, the Court
construed that provision to include a "sincere and
meaningful" belief that "occupies a place in the life
of its possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God,"and in 1970, the Court held
that, as construed, the exemption applied to those
whose sincere beliefs were based on a personal
philosophical, moral, or ethical code. But the
exemption does not apply to a "selective
conscientious objector," one who opposes only
certain wars, even if that opposition is grounded
in a clear theological belief.
Sincerity of Belief
Constitutional protection for the exercise of
religion cannot be a shield for every mountebank
who claims a religious justific-.Jtion for his actions.
Suppose a huckoter !iolicits funds, asst:rting that he
i~ a divine messenger of God. Jn fact. he believes
no such thing; he is interested only in how much
he can rake in. Jn a mail fraud case on these facts,
the Court P'lrmitted the jury to consider the
tlnccrlty of the defendants' claim, but not the truth
of it. If the jury concluded thilt the defendants
honestly believed they were divine messengers,
there could be no conviction: "If one could be sent
to jail becau!K! a jury In a hostile environment found
(rt llglousltcaching faf&e, little indt ed would be ldt
of rellglou• fntedom."

Thill problem remalnll a live and veJ~:fng one, as
rece, I news !dories attest. If 11 ttllle clCempls a
mlnJaler'• real nlate from lnatJon, may othef!
claitn to be.mlnfgten of thdr own reltgkm to obtain
the exemption?
JOOO
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Protected religious practice obviously must not
be confined to belief or expression of belief.
Labeling a practice "conduct" to avoid the free
exercise clause would put much religious ritual at
risk; drinking wine, eating wafers, affixing symbols
to buildings. But it is not less true that religiously
justified conduct has its limits: Ritual murder will
not be condoned because someone somewhere has
called it religious.
The classic instance of state power over conduct
claimed to be integral to the religion is the nowlapsed Mormon belief that polygamy was a
religious duty for men. The Supreme Court in 1878
sustained a conviction of a Mormon who had taken
a second wife in the then territory of Utah in
violation of a federal law. The Court reasoned that
American society was founded on the monogamous
family and that Congress would clearly prohibit
polygamy in the territories to all who did not
profess a religious belief in the necessity of it. Did
the First Amendment shield those who did affirm
it ~s a religious duty7 No, said the Court, for
Congress "was left free to reach actions which were
in violation of social duties or subversive of good
order." It is doubtful that so broadly worded a
justification would be entertained today, for religion
often teaches a violation of some people's social
duties and others' "good order." (For example,
suppose a religion taught the necessity of a man's
living with several women at once, in a state akin
to marriage, if not in the marriage relationship.
Could the state today ban the arrangrment7 Indeed,
it might not be able to ban multiple living
arrangements even without religious justification.)
Nevertheless, the belief·oction distinction retains
some validity. Thus the Court upheld a hospital's
decl6ion to override a parent's objection on religious
grounda to a child's beil'l8 given a lifesaving blood
tran5fusion.

On the other hand, the California Supreme Court
revcr&ed the ronvlcllon of members of the Na!lve
American church for using peyote In l"t'ligtous
ceremonll!ll. Though the M.ale may deny ib U!it' to
othcn, the court held th.tt for lhl' Nav11ho print,
pr.yole wu ctnlral to I~ religious ptaclia of a
genuine and anclrnl church. the drus amounllfl8ln
elfect to a deity.

Oklaltoma !J1u /o11mal

Also, in 1972, the Supreme Court held that
Wisconsin cou.!d not enforce its compulsory public
education laws against the Amish', whose religious
convictions preclude them from sending their
children to school beyond the eighth grade. Finding
that the entire Amish way of life was "not merely
a matter of personal preference but one of deep
religious conviction, shared by an organized group,
and intimately related to daily !lving," the Court
held that enforcing the state's education law "would
gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise"
of the Amish religious beliefs .
To preserve a way of life against the admittedly
secular purposes of the state suggests how high a

deference the Court can pay to the free exercise
clause. But that deference poses a difficulty in tum,
for the free exercise of religion must be that of
individuals, not a way of life. The Court expressly
noted that nothing in the record suggested that the
children wished to attend school despite their
parents' desires. But suppose they did? Not even
parents may maintain an indefinite power to shape
the beliefs of their children. In the end, the liberty
that the First Amendment protects is that of the
individual - even if the child (at least above a
certain age) deserts the faith of her fathers and joins
the rankest of cults. Or at least so it must be if we
are to remain true to the spirit of religious freedom
in America.

U.S. Constitution Bicentennial Notes

znn feurs

November 2

A!JP W4is Dleek

1787: Philt~de/phia Independent Gazetteer printed a pro.J;,drralist Essay.

November 3
1787: William Findley published anU-fedorali<t tract.

November 4
]787: Pdotiah Webster, Philad•lphia m..-chant, published pro-federalist lracl.

NovemberS

1787: Connecticut Courant publl,hed pro-federall•t leiter from "A Landholder."
November 6
1787: 1'<11nsylvania elected delegal.es to slate ratifyifl! convention.

Novembu 7

1787: Nicholas Gilman said that without sound government we would be contemptible even lo savages .

November 8

1767: Geo r8" Wilihington L'llprcssod concerns about his tenants' rent p~ymcnt s lo B3tta ll< Muse.

Oklahoma City Unlveralty School of Law
Alumni Auociatlon

•

Invites you to

Placement Director Rebecca S. Naiman, C.P. C.
and the
Legal Placement Committee
of tl1e

TULSA COUNTY
BAR ASSOCIATION

Luncheon Address by the

Cordially request your attention
to the

Honorable Ralph G. ThompltOD,
Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court,

SERVICE PROVIDED
fnlerviewing-Screening
Te5ltlng and Placement
PLACE: 1146 So. llogton
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119
All members of the As.saciation invited
ar1d Wl.'lconw
COST: One-ltttlf of tin• f/rgf
mouth salrlry- M/n . $500
Mtu. $750- /?rfumled If termimttl.'d
within gfxt,v da]ffi .
Tell.'pl!one: 584-5483
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TI111

"A VIew from the Bench:
Courts Ia lbe 200th Y u
of lhe Collllltullon"

Western District of

Oklahom~:~

•

WedAHday, NoYember II
Noon
SlclrYln Pla1a Hot• l Ballroom
115 per P•l'IIOn

Oklalroma Bar /ormrul

•

Call Sandro LeVan,
401-521·6348
lor reservations
JOOI

VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT
.
U. S. District Court
Northern District of Oklahoma
TITLE:

Legal Assistant (Law Oerk)

LOCATION:

Honorable John Leo Wagner, U. S. Magistrate U. S. District Court,
Northern District of Oklahoma
Room 4-528 U. S. Courthouse
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
918-581-7976

AVAILABLE:

January 11, 1988

RESUMES DUE:

November 16, 1987; one week prior to scheduled interview.

INTERVIEWS
CONDUCTED:

After November 23, 1987

SALARY:

BASIC
REQUIREMENTS:

Pursuant to Statute; Salary Range: $22,458 to $27,172
(JSP-9 to JSP-11, as the Magistrate recommends)

Experience: One year's experience in the practice of law, in legal
research, legal administration, or equivalent experience received after
graduation from law school. Major or substantial legal activities
while in military service may be credited on a month-for-month
basis, whether before or after graduation, but not to exceed one year
if before graduation.
Substitution: A law graduate, either admitted to the bar or awaiting
examination, is eligible as Associate Law Clerk, JSP-10 or JSP-11,
provided he/she has: (1) graduated within the upper 10% of his/her
class from a law school on the approved list of the American Bar
Auociatlon or that of the Association of American Law Schools; or
(2) had experience on the editorial board of law •eview of such a
school and graduated within the upper 15% of the claus; or (3)
sraduitted from a law llChool on the approved list of the American
Bar Auociation or that of the As!lOciation of American Law Schools
with an LLM degree; or, (4) demonstrated proficiency In legal studies
which in the opinion of the appointing magistrate i11 the equivalent to
(1), (2), or (3) above, Qualified law students expected to graduate
not later than December, 1987 will be considered.

The U, S, Dletrlct Court is an Equal Employment Opporlunily Employrr. Vacancies are filled in accordance with the nondiscrlmin11tlon pollciu of the U, S. Government. No fund~ are available for
trantportatlon nKntary for inlervie~a.
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